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Richard A. Musgrave 
It is not surprising that tax reform has followed rather similar patterns in the 
United States and in Canada. Geographic proximity and trade involvement 
alone prohibit extreme divergence, as do shared traditions of tax thinking. At 
the same time, important differences remain. Canada, as a relatively small and 
open economy, cannot afford strategic departures from U.S.  practices, and 
quite different structures of  fiscal federalism impose constraints on both set- 
tings. Nevertheless, common patterns dominate, and future reforms will also 
be subject to similar trends. 
1940-1990:  The Age of Income Tax 
My comments will be directed at these common patterns, but first a word 
about what has happened in the past. The history of tax reform over the past 
half-century, from about 1940 to 1990, has been that of income tax. The cen- 
tral image has been one of personal taxation based on ability to pay and mea- 
sured in terms of  a comprehensive income concept, providing for horizontal 
equity and a progressive burden distribution. The vision began with Henry 
Simons’s writing of  1938 and reached full bloom in the Canadian Carter Com- 
mission Report of  1967.  I  Before the Canadian Political Science Association 
that year, I assessed the Carter Report as follows: 
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The Report is indeed as orthodox as it is  novel  and revolutionary  in its 
conception. It is orthodox in that it follows the basic structure of tax reform 
first laid down by  Henry Simons thirty years ago and expounded since by 
many if not most academic students of taxation. It is revolutionary in that 
these proposals, in  their sweeping totality, are ingeniously applied to the 
Canadian setting and are made the content of a public document, presented 
by  practical men for summary enactment. After sharing in many an effort 
to inch our own (U.S.) tax structure in this direction, I can only marvel at 
the courage of this frontal assault and wish it good-speed.* 
What has happened since? I begin with the Canadian side, where the Carter 
Report opened (or hoped to open) the gate to conclusive income tax reform. 
At its center was the call for uniform taxation of  all income sources, including 
those from extractive industries and from capital gains. The top marginal rate 
was  to be cut to 50 percent, the corporation tax was to be integrated, and, 
reaching beyond income tax reform, Canada’s manufacturing tax was to be 
converted into a retail sales tax. The framework of  base broadening, equali- 
zation, rate cuts, and approximate revenue neutrality was thus set, to be fol- 
lowed twenty years later by  the U.S. reform of  1986 and by reform in other 
countries. But Canada soon faltered in its pioneering role. The Carter Report 
was  met by  almost universal opposition (academics excepted) and got no- 
where in application. It was watered down in a subsequent White Paper and 
once more in the 1971 legislation; the extractive industries, supported by their 
provinces, prevailed, and little of  the original message remained. Instead, a 
decade of income tax deterioration and base loss followed. Only in 1987, and 
following the U.S.  reform of  1986, did the Carter spirit revive. Substantial 
income tax reform was achieved, but the proposed overhaul of  commodity 
taxation-with  VAT in the place of retail tax-is  still unresolved. 
The story of reform in the United States is essentially one of income taxa- 
tion. Ever since the elevation of the income tax to a mass tax at the outset of 
World War 11, the U.S. personal income tax has provided the core of the fed- 
eral tax system. Over most of the period, the system featured steeply progres- 
sive nominal rates which, combined with  a deficient base, yielded a much 
flatter pattern of  effective rates.  Occasional attempts at improvement were 
made, but they were exceptions. In the early 1960s, for example, the invest- 
ment tax credit was included in place of accelerated depreciation as an incen- 
tive device. Loopholes widened, and the inflation of the 1970s brought new 
distortions, with unfair taxation of purely nominal gains. A Carter-style Trea- 
sury document (referred to as Blueprints) appeared in  1977 but failed to gain 
official  tatu us.^  Instead, the supply-side-inspired reform of  198  1 reduced the 
top personal rate from 70 to 50 percent and added a distorting pattern of highly 
accelerated depreciation. 
2. R. A. Musgrave,  “In  Defense of  an Income Concept,” Harvard  Law Review  81, no.  1 
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A change in direction began with the Treasury study of  1984 (referred to as 
Treasury r) and its comprehensive approach to income tax ref01-m.~  In Carter- 
like fashion, the goal was to combine base broadening, especially in relation 
to capital income, with a flattening of  bracket rates. The number of brackets 
was to be reduced to three, with rates of  15, 25, and 35 percent. There was 
also to be a substantial increase in personal exemptions, so as to offset erosion 
by inflation since the late 1970s. In combination, the reform proposals would 
be essentially revenue neutral. Effective rates would be reduced at the lower 
end, but their pattern over the middle and upper range would be left more or 
less unchanged. The net outcome would be to improve horizontal equity and 
to reduce distorting effects. Indexing of  rate brackets would protect against 
inflation. 
Treasury I  was followed by  the administration’s official recommendations 
(Treasury ZZ),  which offered a watered-down version, and then by  the actual 
legislation of  1986.5  The top rate was reduced to 28 percent, but capital gains 
were included in the base. Though falling far short of Treasury I or the Carter 
model, the legislation was nevertheless a major overhaul and was a high point 
of  income tax reform, as was its Canadian counterpart of the following year. 
We  now turn to consider whether this reform trend may be expected to con- 
tinue or whether it will be followed by a change in direction, based on chang- 
ing economic conditions, social climate, and new patterns of tax analysis. As 
in the past, any new trends affecting tax reform are likely to be  shared by 
Canada and the United States. 
The 1990s: New  Patterns of Reform? 
Among major elements of  change, I will note (1) the emergence of  con- 
sumption as a respectable tax base, (2) a flattening of upper-income progres- 
sion, (3) a new perspective on corporation tax, (4) the rise of the payroll tax, 
and (5)  adaptation of tax design to an open economy setting. These develop- 
ments may have substantial bearing on the role of income taxation. 
(1) I begin with the emergence of consumption as a respectable tax base. 
Ever since John Stuart Mill, economists have faulted the income tax base for 
penalizing late consumers and discriminating against saving. The optimal- 
taxation literature of the 1970s further stressed this point. At the same time, 
the consumption base gained in repute by  a change in its image from an in 
rem commodity tax to a personalized expenditure tax. This helped to over- 
come earlier, equity-based objections. The case for the consumption base was 
strengthened by  the compounding difficulties of  income taxation. Many  of 
these, especially those relating to the taxation of capital income under condi- 
tions of inflation, would be bypassed by an expenditure tax. 
4. U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform  for  Fairness, Simplicity ,  and Economic Growth 
5.  President’s Tax Proposals to the Congressfor Fairness, Growth, and  Simplicity (Washington, 
(Washington, D.C., 1984). 
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All this added to the attraction of the consumption base, but the case for a 
personalized and progressive expenditure tax was too novel to seriously enter 
the public discussion. Instead, the love affair with the commodity base fo- 
cused on the value-added tax, which would serve as a superior replacement 
for the turnover tax and a more practicable alternative to the retail sales tax. 
At the same time, it would retain traditional support from some quarters as 
preferable to progressive income taxation, while gaining new support from 
others as a politically feasible, if  second-best, way  of sustaining public ser- 
vices and social programs. As a result of these arguments, the United States 
may  well follow Canada in adding a value-added tax to its federal revenue 
system. 
Whereas a progressive expenditure tax would remain within the family of 
direct taxation, the trend toward VAT  implies not only a change in base, but 
also a change from visible and personal to hidden and in rem taxation. It is 
this latter shift that is especially unfortunate. This trend is supported also in 
the context of  optimal commodity taxation, with its focus on selected com- 
modities as appropriate tax bases. 
(2) Support for progressive rates had eroded with the shrinking of the tax 
base, and it took a drastic plunge in the reforms of the 1980s. Various causes 
may be noted. At the academic level, the case for rate progression was weak- 
ened by  allowance for deadweight loss and its compounding burden as mar- 
ginal rates rise. For any given social welfare function, the pattern of nominal 
rates needed to minimize aggregate welfare loss is thus flatter than had been 
concluded previously. Argued less rigorously, but more important in practice, 
was concern over detrimental effects of high marginal rates on growth and the 
dynamics of  enterprise. In addition, reduced concern with progressivity re- 
ceived support from a change in political climate, reflected in a flattening of 
the social welfare function as perceived by the voting public. While effective 
rate progression over the lower-middle range of the income scale retained ac- 
ceptance, support for extension over the middle-upper range fell off. With 
lower-end progressivity provided for by a personal exemption or credit (a bet- 
ter alternative, used in Canada), a more or less flat nominal rate would take 
care of the remainder. 
To be sure, the steeply rising nominal rates that had prevailed previously in 
many countries were largely ineffective in application, offset as they were by 
an imperfect base. The reforms of  1986 and 1987, with their offsetting rate 
and base adjustments, thus had little effect on the pattern of  effective rates 
over the middle-upper range. The U.S. cut in effective rates had been made in 
1980. Nevertheless, it was the U.S. reform of  1986, with its drastic cut in the 
top bracket rate to 28%, that marked the strategic turning point. In order to 
verify the preexisting pattern of  effective rates to some degree, the reforms 
might have combined base broadening with retention of  some nominal rate 
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pattern of nominal bracket rates. Instead, their failure was ratified, and the 
principle of effective rate progression was withdrawn.6 
Whether the flat-rate perception of  vertical equity is here to stay, time will 
tell. If  so, the question arises whether there remains a raison d’&tre,  under a 
flat-rate system, for a personalized income tax. The inevitably cumbersome 
and complex process of personal taxation was the inevitable price of a system 
seeking (even if  not reaching) to extend effective rate progression over the 
upper range. Without this goal, a flat-rate tax on income at source, combined 
with a flat transfer, would be much the simpler solution. The same holds for 
the consumption base. Under a VAT,  lower-end protection might again be 
built into the base or be  provided via transfers. Needless to say, impersonal 
flat-rate and invisible taxes are not my dream of responsible taxation in a dem- 
ocratic society, but such may be the course of events. 
(3) No major reform changes were made in the treatment ofthe corporation 
income tax, but recent proposals for a cash-flow type business tax fit the above 
pattern. As part of a withholding system for the purpose of a flat-rate income 
tax, the cash-flow tax is inadequate, since the larger part of capital income or 
its interest equivalent is excluded. Only rent and excess profits remain in the 
base. As a withholding tax on wage income, noting that a consumption tax is 
essentially similar to a tax on wage income, it may be seen as “prepayment” 
of a flat-rate consumption tax.’ The idea of a consumption tax has appeal, but 
its shadow image as an income tax  on wage income only will hardly pass 
congressional muster, and perhaps for good reason. 
(4) It might be  argued that transition from general and personal income 
taxation to wage income taxation is nothing new, but has been in process over 
the decades, based on the growth of social security finance. Perhaps so, but I 
feel uneasy viewing the payroll tax as part of the general tax system without 
also allowing for the benefits financed thereby. To  the extent that the payroll 
tax is linked to social security finance, which is more strictly the case in the 
United States than in Canada, its otherwise objectionable nature as regressive 
and in rem gives way to its more meaningful role as an intergenerational ben- 
efit tax. 
(5) Finally, there is the growing importance of  open economy considera- 
tions. As initially visualized in the Tiebout model, a marketlike mechanism of 
voting by  feet could be relied upon to secure an optimal adjustment among 
fiscal jurisdictions; this vision still underlies much of  the discussion.8 The 
6. R. A. Musgrave, “Short of Euphoria,” Journal of  Economic Perspectives 1,  no. 1 (1987):59- 
71. 
7. Charles E. McLure, Jr., J. Mutti, V.  Thuronyi, and G. R. Zodrow, The Taxation of lncome 
from Business  and  Capital  in  Colombia (Bogoti: Ministerio de  Hacienda y  Credit0 Publico, 
1990). 
8. Charles Tiebout,  “An Economic Theory of  Fiscal Decentralization,” in Public Finances: 
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model, when presented in my  Michigan seminar of  1955, was ingenious and 
later became the basic theorem of  fiscal federalism. Nevertheless, its power 
rested on a set of  rather restrictive assumptions, assumptions which do not 
readily permit transfer from the local to the international setting. Among the 
premises are that all factors are equally mobile and that all taxes are paid on a 
strictly benefit basis. As to the former, capital is vastly more mobile in the 
international setting than is labor. As to the latter, a case can be made that 
public services should be financed on a benefit basis, but they are not, and 
even if  they were,  distributional objectives of  the fiscal system would still 
need to be accounted for. Their disregard may have justification at the level of 
local finance but becomes unacceptable at the national level. 
For these and other reasons, the Tiebout model and its invisible-hand solu- 
tion to tax coordination does not resolve the international setting. A statutory 
arrangement has to be provided for to secure an efficient and equitable solu- 
tion. Such an order may take the form of equalization, in which each jurisdic- 
tion remains free to have its own system, but differentials are neutralized. 
Forced uniformity, in this as in other contexts, is to be avoided, so the coor- 
dination technique should be preferred. I was surprised, therefore, to find pri- 
mary concern with equalization in the conference papers. 
The principle of  coordination is straightforward, requiring the country of 
residence to credit source-country withholding. But difficulties remain. Cred- 
iting does not apply to retained earnings, sources may be difficult to identify, 
choice of residency permits tax avoidance, and so forth. These difficulties do 
not arise with the consumption base. A destination-based value-added tax is 
neutral, and even a personal expenditure tax is less open to avoidance by for- 
eign consumption than is an income tax by foreign investment. Once more, 
income taxation seems to be at a disadvantage. 
There is, however, an important reason for its retention. A good system of 
international taxation should be not only efficient and equitable as applied to 
the particular taxpayer, but also equitable between jurisdictions. The principle 
of international equity should be observed, entitling the country of source to a 
share in the income tax base that originates within its borders but accrues to 
foreign-owned ~apital.~  Considerations of benefit taxation aside, such an en- 
titlement arises as a matter of fairness, based upon a concept of international 
property rights agreed to by the participating jurisdictions. The legal property 
order, in an increasingly open world economy, cannot be written in national 
terms only. Implementation of  such an entitlement, unnecessary to add, is of 
particular importance to capital-importing developing countries. 
Suppose first that the countries concerned do not impose a classical corpo- 
ration tax. They nevertheless agree on a mutually acceptable sharing rate and 
impose a corresponding withholding tax as profits are repatriated. To  assure 
9. P. B. Musgrave, “Interjurisdictional Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income,” in Tar Co- 
ordination  in  the European Community, ed. S. Cnossen (Antwerp: Kluwer Law  and Taxation 
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neutrality, the country of residence will then grant a credit against the share- 
holder’s income tax. The same principle applies in a regime of classical cor- 
poration tax. A sharing rate will again be agreed upon, with the withholding 
rate now equal to the excess (plus or minus) of the sharing rate over the source 
country’s rate of  corporation tax. Once more the country of  residence will 
credit the withholding tax against its own corporation tax. In this way, consid- 
erations of both neutrality and equity are reconciled, while each country re- 
tains the freedom to choose its own rate of corporation tax. Contrary to the 
so-called nondiscrimination rule,  setting the sharing rate becomes indepen- 
dent of the countries’ own rates. Whether or not a classical corporation tax is 
applied, it remains necessary to determine taxable profits to which the sharing 
rate applies. Such remains the case even if  domestic taxation is placed on a 
consumption base.  While a VAT  automatically permits the country of  resi- 
dence to tax the consumption of its foreigners, this is hardly an adequate al- 
lowance for base sharing. 
Other elements of change might be noted, which  may condition the tax 
climate of  the  1990s and shape future tax reform. In both Canada and the 
United States, the reforms of the late 1980s may well have marked the end of 
a period. The traditional focus on income, on horizontal equity, and on effec- 
tive rate progression may yield to new directions. Only time will tell whether 
they will bring reform or deform. 
Thomas A. Wilson 
This paper presents a brief comparative review of the tax systems of Canada 
and the United States. Although I will emphasize the differences, it should be 
borne in mind that the two countries’ fiscal systems have many features in 
common, and that the Canada-U.S. tax treaty effectively harmonizes the treat- 
ment of most cross-border income flows. 
I begin with a broad overview of the relative importance of the major taxes, 
and then examine how the two systems deal with several key issues: the treat- 
ment of  income from equities; the treatment of  savings and investment; rate 
schedules; and federal/provincial arrangements. The final two sections of the 
paper review the effects of  recent and proposed tax reforms in  Canada and 
consider possible future fiscal developments as the Canada-U.S. free-trade 
agreement is phased in. 
The “Tax Mix”: The Role of Major Taxes as Revenue Sources 
Table  12.1  compares  the  relative  importance  of  the  major  revenue 
sources-personal  income  taxes,  corporate  income  taxes,  indirect  taxes, 
Thomas A. Wilson is professor of economics and director of the Policy and Economic Analysis 
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Table 12.1  Relative Importance of Major Taxes, 1987 
(Tax Revenues as % of GDPIGNP) 
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Source: David Perry, “International Tax Comparisons,” Canadian Tax Journal  37, no. 5 (1989): 
1341-57. 
wealth taxes, and social security taxes-for  Canada, the United States, and 
the OECD, on average. These data are revenues for all levels of government 
in each country, expressed as percentages of GDP/GNP. 
Two striking differences between the U.S.  and Canadian revenue systems 
appear. Indirect taxes are twice as important in Canada as in the United States, 
reflecting the absence of a federal sales tax in the United States, and somewhat 
higher provincial  retail taxes in Canada relative to state retail taxes in the 
United States. At  10 percent of GDP, the role of indirect taxes in Canada is 
somewhat below the OECD average of  1  1.8 percent. 
On  the other hand, payroll taxes to finance social security programs are 
much more important in the United States than in Canada. At 8.6 percent of 
GDP, U.S. social security taxes are close to the OECD average (9.5 percent), 
and well above the Canadian level. 
Both Canada and the United States rely on the personal income tax (PIT) as 
a principal revenue source, with Canada collecting somewhat more than the 
United States and somewhat more than the OECD average. The relative im- 
portance of the PIT has increased in recent years in both countries. Currently, 
the effective PIT burden in  Canada is almost 25 percent higher than in the 
United States. 
As for corporate income taxes, in recent years this revenue source has been 
declining in relative importance in most countries, including the United States 
and Canada. Current effective rates in Canada and the United States are 2.8 
and  2.4 percent of  GDP,  respectively, just  below  the  3.0  percent  OECD 
average. 
Wealth taxes are surprisingly similar as a revenue source in the two coun- 
tries. Canada has no estate tax, and U.S. estate taxes are not an important 
source of revenue, yielding only 0.2 percent of GNP.  In both countries, the 
most important wealth taxes are taxes on real property, with revenue yields of 
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It is also apparent that the overall tax burden is higher in Canada than in the 
United States, particularly if social security taxes are omitted.lo Without so- 
cial security taxes, the total tax burden in Canada is 29.9 percent of GDP, just 
above the  OECD average  and  well  above the  U.S.  level of  21.4  percent 
of  GNP. 
When social security taxes are included, the gap between Canadian and 
U.S. tax burdens is narrowed. Canada is then 4.5 percentage points below the 
OECD average, but still 4.3 percent above the U.S. level. I shall return to the 
issue of overall burdens after review of certain key differences in the tax struc- 
tures of the two countries. 
The lkeatment of Income from Equities 
As is well known, the United States has a “classical” corporate income 
tax-a  separate tax on corporate income that is generally not integrated with 
the personal income tax.  Ii The Canadian system, by contrast, involves partial 
integration of dividend income (and full integration of dividends from small 
firms). This integration is effected by a “gross-up and credit” applied to divi- 
dend income. At the present time, dividend income is grossed up by  25 per- 
cent before calculating tax and is subject to a 25 percent credit. This effec- 
tively reduces the marginal rate of tax on dividend income, providing partial 
relief from the corporate taxes presumably borne by that income.  l2 
Of  course,  dividend income is not the only component of  income from 
equities. The other major component is capital gains on sale of shares. In the 
United States, since the 1986 tax reform, capital gains are subject to tax on 
realization at full marginal rates. In Canada, a lifetime exemption was intro- 
duced prior to the  1987 tax  reform.  Under tax reform,  the exemption was 
limited to $100,000, and the inclusion rate for other capital gains was raised 
in two stages to 75 percent.  l3 Effective marginal tax rates on capital gains are 
therefore three-quarters of the rate applicable to other income. 
Overall, it is clear that Canada treats income from equities of  Canadian 
firms considerably more favorably than other income under its PIT. This is a 
difference between the Canadian and U.S. tax systems that has persisted over 
time. It represents a deliberate use of the tax system to encourage equity in- 
vestment in Canadian companies by  Canadian residents, perhaps as an out- 
10. Some would argue that, since social security taxes pay for identifiable benefits, they do not 
constitute a burden (or at least as large a burden) as do other taxes. See Boadway and Bruce (ch. 
1 in this volume). 
11. The exception is the tax on small corporations when all stockholders elect partnership treat- 
ment under Suhchapter S. 
12. For example, an individual with a combined top marginal rate of 48 percent would pay 
approximately 35 percent on dividend income. Since the dividend gross-up and credit mechanism 
applies to any dividends paid by Canadian corporations to Canadian residents, dividends from 
corporations that do not pay tax get a credit for “phantom” corporate tax. 
13. Capital gains on shares of small business corporations and capital gains on the sale of family 
farms receive an exemption of $500,000. Prior to the 1987 reforms, the inclusion rate for capital 
gains was 50 percent; this was increased to 66 2/3 percent for 1988 and 1989, and to 75 percent in 
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growth of  public concern about the role of foreign ownership and control of 
Canadian enterprises. 
Tax ’keatment of Savings 
The double taxation of savings, like the double taxation of equity income, 
has long been an issue in the public finance literature. Indeed, proponents of 
consumption-based taxes rely  heavily on  their advantages in  avoiding this 
double taxation and thereby reducing the dead-weight losses associated with 
taxation. 
Both the Canadian and U.S. PITS involve significant departures from the 
Haig/Simons definition of income as a base. Some of these departures-the 
omission of  imputed rental income from the tax base and the deductibility of 
contributions to pension plans-move  the PIT in the direction of a direct tax 
on consumption. 
Overall, the Canadian PIT has moved further in this direction than the U.S. 
PIT has, although some of  the recent “reforms” in Canada have moved the 
Canadian system back toward an income base. 
Both systems exclude imputed income from owned consumer assets from 
the tax base, as is appropriate under a consumption-based tax. However, the 
United States, by permitting deduction of interest paid to acquire these assets, 
effectively encourages acquisition of consumer assets relative to other assets, 
moving the U.S. system away from a pure tax on consumption.I4 
Both systems also allow for favorable treatment of retirement savings, but 
the Canadian RRSP deductions are more generous and more widely available 
than U.S. IRA deductions, and Canada allows deductions for individual con- 
tributions to pension plans, whereas the United States does not. 
Although the 1987 tax reform moved the Canadian PIT away from a con- 
sumption base, it nevertheless remains closer to a consumption base than its 
U.S. counterpart.I5  It is fair to conclude that the marginal rate of return earned 
by many savers in Canada is the before-tax rate of interest, whereas the typical 
saver in the United States earns the after-tax rate of interest.I6 
Tax ’keatment of Investment 
In recent years, both countries have moved (unwisely, in my  opinion) to 
eliminate or reduce many of  the incentives for investment that had previously 
been introduced. The course of corporate tax reform in Canada was charted in 
a White Paper issued in  1985, which proposed the phaseout of  the general 
14. Although currently the deductibility of  interest on loans to finance personal assets is limited 
to mortgages or housing equity loans, it is nevertheless relatively easy for U.S. residents to finance 
acquisition of consumer durables, as well as housing, through such loans. 
15. The most important 1987 Canadian change in this respect is the elimination of  the S1,OOO 
investment-income deduction. Other measures have limited the ability to defer receipt of interest 
income (e.g., by the purchase of deferred annuities). 
16. Canadian taxpayers who have mortgages on their residences typically earn the before-tax 
rate of interest when they. pay down their mortgages. Furthermore, many Canadian taxpayers have 
not reached their RRSP  contribution limits. 369  Reflections on Canada4J.S. Tax Differences 
investment tax credit over a three-year period, reductions in capital cost al- 
lowance rates, other base-broadening measures, and substantial reductions in 
statutory rates.17  The first step was implemented in the 1986 budget, and sub- 
sequent steps were included in the 1987 tax reform package. 
In the United States, the 1986 tax reform act swept away the general invest- 
ment tax credit and sharply limited allowable depreciation rates. Coupled with 
other base-broadening measures, these changes permitted substantial reduc- 
tions in statutory rates. 
Both countries have probably somewhat reduced the interindustry and in- 
terasset distortions under their corporate income taxes, but at the cost of  in- 
creased intertemporal distortions. As I noted in a previous paper1*  the tax 
reforms shifted the tax burden from old capital to new  capital, thereby in- 
creasing the effective tax rate on investment.I9 
’Igx lkeatment of the Family 
A salient difference between the two personal income tax systems is the 
definition of the taxpaying unit. In the United States, because of income split- 
ting through joint returns, the basic unit is effectively the nuclear couple; in 
Canada, the personal income tax is largely on an individual basis.“ 
Taxing income on an individual basis can reduce tax disincentives for the 
lower-income spouse. Canada’s recent tax reform, by  replacing the spousal 
exemption with a credit, has further reduced such tax disincentives. Under the 
current Canadian tax system, the “secondary” earner faces tax initially at the 
lowest bracket rate. In contrast, under the U.S. system, the effective marginal 
rate of tax for the lower-income spouse is the appropriate marginal rate on the 
couple’s combined income. 
Like many issues in taxation, this advantage to the Canadian system entails 
a cost in  the form of extraordinarily complex “attribution” rules to prevent 
shifting of property income from the higher to the lower-income spouse. The 
obvious solution is to combine the best features of  the two systems. For ex- 
ample, earned income could be taxed on an individual basis, as in Canada, 
and property income on a pooled basis, as in the United States.21 
The two countries have also adopted very different treatments for dependent 
17. Hon. Michael Wilson, The Corporate Tax System: A Direction for Change (Ottawa: De- 
partment of Finance, Government of Canada, 1985). 
18. Thomas A. Wilson, “The Corporate Income Tax Proposals: Reform or Retrogression,” in 
Report of  the Policy Forum on Reform of  the Corporate Income Tax System, ed. Jack M. Mintz 
and Douglas D. Purvis (Ontario: Queen’s  University, Nov. 1985). 
19. This is strictly true for investments made by taxable firms. For risky investments by firms 
who are,  or may be in tax loss positions, the reduction in statutory rates may outweigh the removal 
of tax credits. See Vijay Jog and Jack Mintz, “Corporate Tax Reform and its Economic Impact: 
An Evaluation of Phase  1 Proposals,” in The Economic Impacts of Tax Reform, ed. lack Mine 
and John Whalley, pp. 83-124.  (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989). 
20. The Canadian PIT is no longer strictly on an individual basis. Certain credits are transfer- 
able between spouses, and the child tax credit is clawed back on the basis of family income. 
21. An alternative method would be joint returns, coupled with adequate earned-income credits 
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children.  The U.S.  PIT provides the  same exemption  for a child as for an 
adult.  Until recently,  the Canadian PIT provided  a much smaller exemption 
for a child, coupled with refundable tax credits and taxable transfers (family 
allowances). Following tax reform, the Canadian system now provides a mix- 
ture of nonrefundable tax credits, refundable tax credits that are clawed back, 
and taxable transfers that are proposed to be clawed back.** 
The Canadian system clearly delivers better child benefits for lower- and 
lower-middle-income families than does the United States system. But as in- 
come rises,  at some point middle-income families find their benefits begin- 
ning to be clawed back, and at a higher income level, all child benefits except 
the nonrefundable tax credit would be totally clawed 
Rate Schedules 
Following the 1986 and 1987 tax reforms, both countries reduced the num- 
ber of rate brackets and lowered their top marginal rates. In the United States, 
what appears on the surface to be two brackets, with a top rate of 28 percent, 
is in reality four brackets with a top rate of  33 percent (applied to the third, 
but not the final, bracket).  In Canada, what was proposed to be three rate 
brackets has since become four brackets (because of the high-income surtax). 
Furthermore, effective marginal rates in the Canadian system are also affected 
by the various clawbacks of refundable credits and transfer payments, so that 
the number of true tax brackets is even larger.24 
Providing fewer brackets has been justified on grounds of tax simplifica- 
tion, but I do not accept this argument. While there is no denying that a single 
rate would permit a vast simplification of the system, two brackets imply al- 
most the same degree of complexity as fifteen! The problems of tax shelters, 
income splitting, and income averaging arise as soon as there is more than one 
effective marginal rate. 
The top marginal income tax rate has been lowered significantly over the 
past ten years. Currently, the top U.S. federal rate is 33 percent, and the top 
Canadian federal rate will soon be 32 percent. Although the top marginal rates 
of the federal PITS are quite similar, significant differences emerge when state 
and provincial income taxes are taken into account. Data provided in Vaillan- 
court (ch.  11 in this volume) indicate that the typical  top marginal  rate for 
U.S. state income tax is 6.6 percent (deductible from federal tax), whereas 
22. For a detailed discussion of the Canadian and U.S.  treatments of dependent children, see 
Kesselman (ch. 3 in this volume). 
23. A measure in the 1990 federal budget would claw back family allowances at a 15 percent 
rate, starting at an  individual income level of  $50,000 for the higher-income spouse. A single- 
earner family with two children would see its family allowance payments totally clawed back at 
an income level just above $55,000. 
24. The refundable sales tax credit is clawed back at a 5 percent rate, starting at a family income 
level of $18,000. The refundable child tax credit is also clawed back at a 5 percent rate, but the 
clawback begins at a family income of $24,750. OAS and family allowance payments are pro- 
posed to be  clawed back at a  15 percent rate on an  individual basis, starting at an individual 
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the typical top marginal rate for provincial income tax in Canada is  17 per- 
cent. As a result, the combined marginal rate of federal plus provincial tax in 
Canada is typically much higher than the combined rate in the United States. 
Indeed, in most provinces the combined top marginal rates approach 50 per- 
cent, whereas the highest combined marginal rate in the United States is about 
42 percent.  25 
FederaYProvincial Fiscal Arrangements 
There are two features of  the Canadian federal tax system that have no 
counterpart in the United States. First, the federal government has entered into 
collection agreements with  nine of  the  ten  provinces  for personal  income 
taxes, and with seven provinces for corporate income taxes. This has led to 
much greater subnational harmonization of the income tax systems in Canada 
than in the United States. It may also have lowered the political cost of raising 
provincial taxes, since individuals see only one line for income tax withheld 
on their payroll statements and write only one check to settle their balances 
each April. 
Second,  and  more  important,  are the  equalization arrangements, under 
which the federal government equalizes the revenue yield of  taxes in lower- 
income provinces up to the average yield of the five richest provinces; seven 
out of ten provinces currently receive equalization payments.26  Equalization 
clearly reduces the cost of public goods relative to private goods in those prov- 
inces  .27 
Effects of Recent Proposed Tax Reforms in Canada 
The income tax reforms of the past four years have moved the Canadian 
income tax system somewhat away from a consumption-based tax and have 
removed or lessened tax incentives for investment. It is reasonable to conclude 
that the net effect of  the income tax reforms has been an increase in the tax 
burden on savings and investment.28 
Phase I1 of tax reform was originally designed to do two things: to replace 
the antiquated manufacturers’ sales tax with a new consumption-based value- 
added tax; and to shift the tax mix from direct to indirect taxes by  reducing 
personal income taxes and increasing sales taxes. 
25. For 1990, the combined top marginal rate equaled or exceeded 48 percent in all provinces 
except British Columbia, Alberta, and Nova Scotia. 
26. Provincial and Municipal Finances, 1989 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1990), table 
13.2. 
27. The provision of certain public goods has been encouraged under federal/provincial shared- 
cost programs. However, the most important of  these-medical  care and higher education-have 
been  subsumed  under the “Established  Programs Financing Arrangements,” under which they 
have, in effect, become unconditional transfers. 
28. For  an analysis of the economic effects of the income tax reforms, see Peter Dungan and 
Thomas Wilson, “Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Reform in Canada,” Canadian Tar Journal 36, 
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In fact, the government has implemented  the second objective by  succes- 
sive  increases  in  sales  taxes,  without  reducing  income  taxes.  The current 
plans for the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) entail no significant income 
tax reductions, aside from the sales tax credits needed to offset the regressivity 
of the GST. The proposed new sales tax system, on balance, will bring in the 
same net revenue as the old, but the burden will be shifted from investment 
and exports to consumption. 
The government’s tax reform proposals have therefore worked at cross pur- 
poses, by  increasing  the tax burden on savings and investment through the 
income tax reforms of  Phase I, and by reducing the tax burden on savings in 
the sales tax reforms of  Phase 11. We  might have done as well with a simple 
reform of the sales tax system alone. 
One other issue, incorporated  in the  1981 U.S. tax reforms but  ignored 
under the Canadian proposals, is adjusting the tax system for inflation. Up to 
1985, the Canadian tax system incorporated more complete adjustment to in- 
flation than did the U.S.  system, as income tax brackets and exemptions were 
fully  indexed to the CPI.29  Although  asset values  were not  indexed, it was 
possible to get indexed treatment of equity investment by holding equities in 
registered plans (ISIPs). The only assets for which the U.S. system provided 
better adjustment for inflation were inventory investments, since LIFO valua- 
tion  provided  near-complete  exemption of  phantom inventory  profits.  In 
Canada, a 3 percent inventory allowance provided only partial relief from the 
impact of inflation on inventory profits. 
In 1985-86,  the positions were reversed. The Canadian federal budget of 
1985 limited the indexation of brackets and exemptions to the rate of inflation 
less 3 percent, and the ISIPs were abolished. The 3 percent inventory allow- 
ance was eliminated in the first phase of corporate tax reform the following 
year. In the United States, on the other hand, full indexation of exemptions 
and rate brackets came into effect in 1985. 
As neither Canada nor the United States indexes asset values or capital cost 
allowances, inflation will continue to affect the incidence of the tax system on 
capital income in both countries. 
Issues for the Future 
The key issue is whether the phase-in of the Canada-U.S.  free-trade agree- 
ment (FTA), prospective lowering of trade barriers with other countries, and 
increased “globalization” of financial and product markets will necessitate in- 
creased harmonization  of tax systems. This, fortunately, is an area in which 
public finance theory provides useful insights. The key is the mobility of the 
factors bearing the tax. 
29. During the federal government’s “6 and 5”  program of  public-sector wage restraints, the 
30. If inventories are financed by debt, LIFO valuation is an overly generous offset to inflation. 
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Factors of production that have perfect international mobility can in the 
limit be taxed on a benefit basis. Where similar public benefits are provided 
to such factors in two countries, we should expect tax rates to be similar, if 
not the same. Less mobile factors of  production can be taxed more heavily 
than the rates consistent with benefit taxation, and perfectly immobile factors 
can bear tax as if they were located within a closed economy. 
The above remarks apply to the direct taxation of factor incomes at source. 
Increased tax harmonization will therefore likely occur for those factors that 
become more mobile as a result of globalization and the FTA. As capital was 
already highly mobile between Canada and the United States, there would 
appear to be little that the FTA could do to increase capital mobility. However, 
when the mobility of intangible assets is taken into account, the FTA should 
increase, or at least protect, the cross-border mobility of business enterprise. 
The one area in which international capital mobility has clearly been less than 
perfect is foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is associated with technology 
transfer and with the earning of returns on intangible assets. FDI has also been 
subject to government controls, generally in Canada and in selected sectors in 
both countries. The FTA, by limiting general government intervention in Can- 
ada and preventing it in the United States, should increase the cross-border 
mobility of FDI. Furthermore, since the FTA  increases the cross-border mo- 
bility of  certain individuals, the mobility of enterprises as “going concerns” 
should also be increased. 
What one would predict is that the FTA  and globalization will serve to 
reinforce the trend toward harmonization of corporate tax systems. The har- 
monization of corporate systems is not a new phenomenon. It is noteworthy 
that effective corporate tax rates are much more equal both internationally and 
within the Canadian and U.S.  federations than are the other major taxes.31 
Given the importance of  cross-border direct and portfolio investments, the 
governments of  Canada and the United States should consider more effective 
coordination of taxes bearing on these investments, for the reasons stated by 
Gordon (ch. 2 in this volume). 
My final comment has to do with indirect taxation. Typically, sales taxes 
are established on a “destination basis.’’ However, such taxes are avoided by 
cross-border purchasing. Within a country, it is virtually impossible to prevent 
some  leakage  from  high-tax  to  low-tax jurisdictions. Between countries, 
cross-border purchasing can be  better controlled at border-entry monitoring 
points. Nevertheless, the cross-border  mobility of buyers remains important. 
Harmonization of VATS has become an issue in Europe, where it is recog- 
nized that the dismantling of  internal border controls would permit wide- 
31. Corporate faxes within the OECD countries range from 1.3 to  7.5 percent of  GDP. By 
contrast, the range of personal income taxes is from 5.7 to 25.6 percent of GDP; social security 
taxes from 0.0  to 22.2  percent of GDP; and indirect taxes from 3.9 to 19.4  percent of GDP (David 
Perry,  “Intemafisnal Tax  Comparisons,” Canadian Tax Journal  37, no. 5  [1989]: fable 2, p. 
1352). For Canada and the United States, see the data in Vaillancourt, (ch. 11 in this volume). 374  Richard A. Musgrave 1 Thomas A. Wilson 
spread cross-border shopping. This is not yet an issue in the North American 
context,  since the FTA  falls short of  a common  market  or even a customs 
union. But with the increased mobility of individuals, and with the proposed 
extension of the Canadian federal sales tax to services, the degree of tax har- 
monization of  indirect taxes may yet become important. 